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Quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) is an encryption method that allows quantum com-
putation to be performed on one party’s private data with the program provided by another party,
without revealing much information about the data nor the program to the opposite party. We
propose a framework for (interactive) QHE based on the universal circuit approach. It contains a
subprocedure of calculating a classical linear polynomial, which can be implemented with quantum
or classical methods; apart from the subprocedure, the framework has low requirement on the quan-
tum capabilities of the party who provides the circuit. We illustrate the subprocedure using a quite
simple classical protocol with some privacy tradeoff. For a special case of such protocol, we obtain
a scheme similar to blind quantum computation but with the output on a different party. Another
way of implementing the subprocedure is to use a recently studied quantum check-based protocol,
which has low requirement on the quantum capabilities of both parties. The subprocedure could
also be implemented with a classical additive homomorphic encryption scheme. We demonstrate
some key steps of the outer part of the framework in a quantum optics experiment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure quantum computing is an interesting research
field that draws ideas from classical cryptography and
quantum mechanics. It aims to keep the input data or
the program private when two parties perform a quan-
tum computation on possibly restricted sets of input
states, while the input and the output may be on one
or both parties. Blind quantum computing (BQC) [1–4]
and “quantum computing on encrypted data” [5, 6] are
two types of problems for which there are satisfactory
protocols. Quantum homomorphic encryption is a differ-
ent but related problem, and is the topic of this paper.
Blind quantum computing is a task in which a client
knows both the data and the program but can only do
limited quantum operations, and the main part of the
computation is carried out by the server, who is not able
to learn the data nor the program by design of the proto-
col. The BQC scheme in [1] builds on the measurement-
based quantum computing model. There are other BQC
schemes based on the circuit model [2], or the ancilla-
driven model [3]. On the other hand, “Quantum comput-
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ing on encrypted data”, or delegated quantum computa-
tion [5, 6], allows a publicly known quantum program to
be run by a server on secret quantum data provided by
a client.
In classical cryptography, homomorphic encryption
(HE) is an encryption scheme that allows computation
to be performed (effectively on the plaintext after de-
cryption) while having access only to the ciphertext. A
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme allows for
any computation to be performed in such fashion [7–10].
Quantum homomorphic encryption (QHE) allows some
classes of quantum computation to be performed without
accessing the unencrypted data, and quantum fully ho-
momorphic encryption (QFHE) is similarly defined with
the allowed class of quantum computation being univer-
sal. The goals of QHE are that the final computation
result is correct, and the data and the final computation
result are known only to the data-provider, who learns
little about the circuit performed beyond what can be
deduced from the computation result itself. Schemes for
QHE [11–21] with varying degrees of success have been
proposed. Some techniques in QHE have been applied
to the problem of computing on shared quantum secrets
[22]. QHE schemes for arbitrary unrestricted circuits are
shown to require exponential resources [17, 18, 23, 24].
Although [23] and some results on bipartite quantum
2computation of classical functions [25–27] suggest that
the goal of both perfect data privacy and near-perfect
circuit privacy cannot be reached in the plain model with-
out aborts, the recent work [28] suggests that when some
party is allowed to abort, some nontrivial level of secu-
rity can be reached. An experimental implementation of
homomorphic-encrypted quantum walk proposed in [11]
has been reported [29]. An experimental demonstration
of computationally-secure QFHE is shown in [30].
In this paper, we introduce a framework for (interac-
tive) QHE schemes, intended to work for general quan-
tum input with a polynomial-sized circuit. We refer to
“interactive QHE scheme” as any protocol that achieves
the goals of QHE (the correctness of final result, and
the security of the data and the circuit) while allow-
ing multiple rounds of communication. The flexibility
in the framework is that one subprocedure, namely the
evaluation of the classical linear polynomials, can be re-
placed by any quantum or classical protocol for such task.
The main computation is on the side of Alice, who pro-
vides the data. The framework depends on a “program
state” method which is seen in ancilla-driven blind quan-
tum computing [3], and it takes hint from a “universal
circuit” method in [6, Supplementary Note 1]. If not
considering the implementation of the subprocedure, the
party Bob who provides the circuit need only have very
limited quantum capability: to prepare and send single-
qubit states in one of two bases, or to make single-qubit
measurements in one of two bases. This point distin-
guishes it from the framework in [15, 16], where the main
quantum computation is carried out by the party who
provides the circuit, so that both parties need to be able
to store at least n qubits (in the case of quantum input;
and n is the input size).
We provide two example classes of protocols for the
subprocedure for evaluating the classical linear polyno-
mials. The first class is entirely classical, and it satisfies
that the degree of data privacy is in a tradeoff with that
of the circuit privacy, both in the subprocedure and in
the overall scheme. One end of such tradeoff is that the
data is completely insecure, and then the circuit is quite
(but not completely) secure, which yields a scheme sim-
ilar to blind quantum computing, but the output is on
the Alice (server) side, rather than on the party with the
initial program. When the input state is classical or a
product real state, the tradeoff between the data privacy
and the circuit privacy is unexpectedly good compared
to the case of general quantum input. The second way of
implementing the subprocedure is to use a recently stud-
ied quantum check-based protocol [28], which has low
requirement on the quantum capabilities of both parties:
each party need only do repeated quantum operations on
a constant number of qubits at a time.
The framework under the two classes of protocols for
evaluating classical linear polynomials have modest re-
source costs: for the first class, the entanglement and
classical communication costs are linear in the product
of circuit size and the input size; for the second class, the
costs are polynomial in circuit size and the input size.
We demonstrate the key steps of the outer part of
framework (but not the subprocedure for evaluating clas-
sical linear polynomials) in a quantum optics experiment.
In Sec. IV, we mention that the subprocedure for evalu-
ating the classical linear polynomials could also be imple-
mented with a classical additive homomorphic encryption
scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec. II
presents the framework for interactive QHE, and briefly
introduces the two classes of protocols for the subpro-
cedure of evaluation of the classical linear polynomials.
Sec. III presents the experimental methods and the re-
sults of the experiment. Sec. IV contains some discus-
sions. Sec. V contains the conclusions.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR INTERACTIVE QHE
First, we introduce the method of using program states
in our scheme. A circuit diagram is shown in Fig. 1
below. The lower qubit is referred to as the program
register, and its state φ(θ) = 1√
2
(cos θ|0〉 + i sin θ|1〉) is
called the program state. It interacts with a data qubit
(the first qubit in the figure) via a fixed controlled-σj
gate (where j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and σ1 = σx, σ2 = σy , σ3 = σz
are the Pauli operators), and then the program register
is subject to a Hadamard gate H, and measured in the
Z basis. (By viewing the Hadamard gate as a change of
basis, the lower qubit is effectively measured in the X
basis.) When the measurement result is 0, the one-qubit
gate cos(θ)I+i sin(θ)σj is implemented on the first qubit.
When the measurement result is 1 and the program state
is not in the Z basis (i.e. θ 6= kpi
2
for integer k), a unitary
correction is needed, to make the effective gate on the
data qubit the same as in the case that the measurement
outcome is 0. The form of the correction depends on
the program state: it is cos(2θ) I + i sin(2θ)σj . When
the correction is a Pauli operator not equal to I, which
3happens when θ = kpi
4
with odd k, this correction can
be deferred by commuting it through the Clifford gates
in later parts of the protocol. Note that two mutually
orthogonal states of the program register correspond to
the same program up to a Pauli correction known to Bob.
If Alice knows that the program state is one of these two
states, she can of course make a projective measurement
to distinguish them. But when Alice is not sure that the
program state is one of these two states, e.g. when there
are four possible states in two different bases, she cannot
know the exact program state, which happens in the case
discussed below Eq. (2).
|ψ〉
|φ(θ)〉
σj
H m
FIG. 1: The gadget for using the program state (in the lower
qubit) to implement a gate cos(θ)I + i sin(θ)σj on the data
qubit (the upper qubit). This circuit is done entirely by
Alice in Scheme 1. The lower qubit is initially in a real
state φ(θ) = 1√
2
(cos θ|0〉 + i sin θ|1〉). The two-qubit gate is
controlled-σj , where j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. By viewing the Hadamard
gate as a change of basis, the lower qubit is effectively mea-
sured in the X basis. For the measurement outcome m = 1,
a unitary correction cos(2θ) I+ i sin(2θ) σj is required on the
data qubit. But in Scheme 1, rather than doing the correc-
tion immediately, Bob updates his coefficients in some linear
polynomials of the form (5) in order to do corrections later.
In the scheme below, some program states are pro-
duced by Bob through his measurement on some shared
entangled state with Alice. From a security point of view,
such remote operation is not really necessary. Bob could
directly send some states to Alice as the program states,
or directly prepare some program states using Alice’s ex-
perimental apparatus (in the latter case, for security of
Alice’s data, we have to assume that Bob has no access
to Alice’s data states when doing so). Alice encrypts her
data using the quantum one-time-pad first, before letting
her data interact with the program states. Such encryp-
tion is for protecting the data from possible leakage due
to that some measurement outcomes are sent to Bob. See
Sec. IV for more explanations.
Since every one-qubit Clifford gate can be expressed as
the product of some Clifford gates of the form
cos(θ)I+ i sin(θ)σj ,
with θ =
kpi
4
, for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, (1)
the program states can be used to implement one-qubit
Clifford gates. Alice can of course implement two-qubit
gates by herself, but we need a nontrivial two-qubit gate
or the identity to be implemented according to Bob’s
choice. This is done as follows. Let Γ = 1−i
2
(I⊗ I+ iZ⊗
Z) = diag (1,−i,−i, 1). It is a two-qubit Clifford gate.
The following construction accommodates a free choice
of a gate in the set {I⊗ I,Γ} using a fixed sequence of Γ
interleaved with single-qubit Clifford gates:
Γ (I⊗ H) Γ (I⊗ H) Γ (Z⊗ H) Γ = e−pii/4Γ,
Γ · Γ · Γ · Γ = I⊗ I. (2)
The Γ gate can be implemented by Alice. The one-
qubit Clifford gates in Eq. (2) can be implemented by
the program-state method, and Bob has a choice as to
whether to implement the H or I by choosing appropri-
ate program states, according to whether he wants to
implement the overall gate Γ or I ⊗ I. The H and I
are both products of some one-qubit Clifford gates of
the form (1) that are implementable by program states.
(The Pauli corrections in the implementations can be de-
layed.) Thus the choice between H and I is realized by
different choices of program states at each gate of the
form (1). For each one-qubit Clifford gate of the form
(1), the average state of the two possible program states
is the maximally mixed state. Hence, Alice is ignorant
of which gate is implemented, when she has not received
any information about the Pauli corrections. (Another
way to see this fact is to consider the generation of pro-
gram states by Bob’s measurement on his qubit in an
EPR pair, which is in Scheme 1 below. Before Bob tells
Alice any information about the Pauli corrections, Alice
received no messages, so she had no information about
which gate Bob intends to implement.)
Alice initially encrypts her input data qubits using the
quantum one-time-pad, which means applying random
Pauli operators. The choice of the Pauli operators are
recorded as 2n bits: the Pauli operator XjZk is recorded
as two bits j and k. These 2n bits are unknown to Bob,
so he regards them as variables. The variables are un-
changed in the procedures of the scheme below, and Bob
changes the coefficients for them in the polynomials in
the scheme [i.e. in Eq. (5), Bob updates the coefficients
ai but not the variables xi]. The way Bob changes the
coefficients is because of some key-update rules, and we
call them effective key-update rules below, since they do
not change Alice’s keys but rather change Bob’s coeffi-
cients. The effective key-update rules can be easily ob-
4tained from the following relations:
PX = iXZP, PZ = ZP,
HX = ZH, HZ = XH,
CNOT12(X
a
1Z
b
1 ⊗ Xc2Zd2) = (Xa1Zb⊕d1 ⊗ Xa⊕c2 Zd2)CNOT12,
(3)
where the ⊕ is addition modulo 2, and in the gate
CNOT12, the qubit 1 is the control. The effective key-
update rules under the T gate can be obtained from the
relations
TZ = ZT, TX = e−pii/4PXZT. (4)
More details about the key-update rules are in [15, 16].
The detailed steps of our scheme are shown in Scheme
1 below. Starting from step 2, we distinguish the case of
classical or product real input from the case of general
quantum input. For each T gate in the desired circuit,
Alice and Bob perform a subprocedure to evaluate a clas-
sical linear polynomial of the form
y = (c+
m∑
i=1
aixi) mod 2, (5)
with the output being a bit on Alice’s side, indicating
whether a P† gate should be done after the T gate, to
compensate for differences on different Pauli masks due
to the T gate. The ai are coefficients known to Bob,
and the xi are variables known to Alice. The m is 2n in
the case of general quantum input, but is n in the case
of classical or product real input, since then the initial
Pauli corrections are only of the Y = σy type, which
suffice for making the average state maximally mixed.
The “classical input” refers to that the input qubits are
in the state |0〉 or |1〉. The “product real input” refers to
that the input is the tensor product of real qubit states.
For the stage of Clifford gates after the last T gate, Alice
and Bob perform two instances of the subprocedure for
each of the output qubits, and the output bits are for
what Pauli corrections Alice should do on each output
qubit.
Scheme 1. A framework for interactive QHE.
1. Bob decomposes the desired circuit using Clifford
and T gates, where the Clifford gates involved only in-
clude the Γ gate and the single-qubit Clifford gates.
Alice and Bob prepare some EPR pairs in the state
(|00〉+ |11〉)/√2. Bob measures his qubits in the entan-
gled pairs in the Z or Y basis, according to the desired
program to be performed on Alice’s data. After the mea-
surement, Alice’s qubit in each pair (denoted a) is in one
of the following four states in Bob’s view: |0〉, |1〉, |y+〉,
|y−〉, which are referred to as the program states. In this
way, Bob effectively sends the program states to Alice.
2. In the case of general quantum input, Alice does a
random Pauli gate on each input data qubit, and locally
records the 2n Pauli mask bits, with bit value 1 indicating
a Pauli gate X or Z was done. These 2n bits are Alice’s
variables in the linear polynomials to be evaluated by
both parties. In the case that the input is classical or a
direct product of real qubit states, Alice does a random
Pauli Y = σy gate on each input data qubit, and locally
records the n Pauli mask bits, with bit value 1 indicating
a Pauli gate Y was done.
3. Bob sends Alice some message about which qubit
each program state should interact with, and the type
of interaction for each program state (controlled-Z, or
controlled-X, or controlled-Y), and where to insert the
Γ gates and T gates between uses of the program states
(including the information about which qubit any Γ gate
or T gate acts on). Bob keeps track of the change in
coefficients for the variables (in the linear polynomials to
be evaluated by both parties) due to such program states.
4. For each T in the desired circuit, Alice does the
following:
(1) Alice does the fixed Γ gates before a T gate, inter-
spersed with some gadgets for single-qubit Clifford gates:
for each program state corresponding to logical gates
before the current T gate, she does a controlled-Z (or
controlled-X, controlled-Y) gate on qubits aq, where a is
the received qubit and q is a data qubit.
(2) Alice measures all such qubits a in the {|+〉, |−〉} ba-
sis. She sends Bob all available measurement outcomes.
(3) Bob determines the coefficients in a linear polynomial
according to Alice’s messages and her previous messages,
together with his knowledge about the program states.
Alice and Bob perform the subprocedure for evaluating
this linear polynomial for the qubit that a T gate acts on.
Alice applies the T gate on such qubit, and, according to
the output of the corresponding polynomial, performs the
P† gate on the same qubit.
5. For the last part of Clifford gates after the last T
gate in the desired circuit, Alice does the following:
(1) Alice does the fixed Clifford gates including the Γ
gates, interspersed with the gadget for some single-qubit
Clifford gates: for each program state, she does a
controlled-Z (or controlled-X, controlled-Y) gate on
qubits aq, where a is the received qubit and q is a data
qubit.
5(2) Alice measures all such qubits a in the {|+〉, |−〉} ba-
sis. She sends Bob all available measurement outcomes.
(3) Bob determines the coefficients in some linear poly-
nomials according to Alice’s messages and her previous
messages, together with his knowledge about the pro-
gram states. Alice and Bob perform the subprocedures
for evaluating two linear polynomials for each output
qubit. Alice applies XjZk on each output qubit, where j
and k are the output of the corresponding polynomials.
This completes the protocol.
Note that in the step 1, Bob uses local measurement
with the help of entanglement to prepare the program
states on Alice’s side, rather than direct sending of the
program states, since any failure in preparation of the en-
tangled pairs can be remedied by preparing a new pair,
while direct sending of the program states may have some
rate of failure which is not acceptable. Another remark is
on the use of the three types of controlled-Pauli gates. In
principle, controlled-Z gate together with some fixed Clif-
ford gates suffice for replacing the role of all three types
of controlled-Pauli gates with the fixed Clifford gates, e.g.
in ancilla-driven blind quantum computation [3]. But the
use of three types of controlled-Pauli gates here partially
reduces the need for fixed types of gates on Alice’s side,
while not leaking much information about the circuit to
Alice. Anyway, the sequence of Clifford gates would form
an almost random Clifford circuit, if the number of pro-
gram states used is large, no matter they are for one or
three types of controlled-Pauli gates.
The argument for the correctness of the scheme con-
sists of two parts: one is that the program states and
associated operations indeed perform the desired Clifford
gates. The other is that the key-update rules for T gates
are correct. Both follow from elementary calculations.
We introduce two classes of protocols to be used for
the subprocedure of evaluating classical linear polynomi-
als. The overall scheme is interactive under both classes
of protocols. For techniques of turning the scheme into
a constant-round scheme, see the use of a teleportation
gadget in the constant-round QHE scheme in [28]. Such
type of gadget was introduced in [16].
The first class of protocols is completely classical. Al-
ice sends k variables (mask bits) to Bob in plaintext, and
hides all remaining mask bits (2n− k in the case of gen-
eral quantum input, and n− k in the case of classical or
product real input). The choices of the sent variables are
the same among all linear polynomials. Bob tells Alice a
linear polynomial containing only the variables that are
unknown to him. The generic form of the original poly-
nomial is y = (c+
∑m
j=1 aixi) mod 2, but since some xi
are known to Bob, the number of variables appearing in
Bob’s polynomial becomes fewer. The constant term in
Bob’s polynomial absorbs his coefficients for those vari-
ables known to him.
The second class is the protocol for evaluating lin-
ear polynomials in [28]. It contains one of a few differ-
ent quantum check-based protocols for generating initial
classical correlations (called “one-time tables”) in [28].
The one-time tables are generated prior to the main com-
putation. Some checks are performed by one or both par-
ties to prevent the opposite party from cheating. So the
protocols may abort when some party insists on cheating.
If the party being checked indeed wants to perform the
computation, he (she) should almost not cheat, as cheat-
ing does not bring much benefit in learning the opposite
party’s data, since the checks are before the main com-
putation. The protocol for evaluating linear polynomials
in [28] has distributed output (the XOR of two remote
bits), while the use here has output on Alice’s side only,
so we need Bob to send Alice one bit at the end, which
partially affects Bob’s privacy. (Such partial leakage is
mitigated by possible recompilations of the circuit in the
overall interactive QHE scheme). With that minor point
set aside, our interactive QHE scheme under the second
class of protocols has asymptotic information-theoretic
data privacy and circuit privacy, under some choice of
the check-based protocol for generating one-time tables.
But the circuit privacy is slightly worse than that of the
interactive scheme in [28], which uses a so-called garden-
hose gadget for performing a possible P† correction after
a T gate. The current scheme is easier to implement
because it does not need to use such gadget, while the
scheme in [28] cannot get rid of it because the location
of the main computation is on Bob’s side.
In the following we discuss the security of Scheme 1
under the first class of protocols, i.e. the partly-secure
classical protocols. We first discuss the case of general
quantum input. The input data is partially secure in
Scheme 1. Some of the input qubits are protected by
Pauli masks. Thus, even if the outcomes of measure-
ments on the program registers are sent to Bob, he can-
not find out any information about the input state on
these qubits. Some qubits may have some of the Pauli
masks known to Bob, thus he may measure his qubit in
his entangled pair in some suitable basis, and together
6with the measurement outcome on Alice’s program reg-
ister, he can get some information about the data. Such
measurement by Bob may affect the correctness of com-
putation. In the case of classical input, Bob’s similar
operation can be regarded as copying of the classical in-
put, and it does not affect the correctness. The case of
classical or product real input would have better tradeoff
between data privacy and circuit privacy, since Bob has
much fewer coefficients to tell Alice in each polynomial,
for the same value of k.
Under the first class of protocols for the subprocedure,
the circuit in Scheme 1 is partially secure, and the de-
gree of circuit privacy depends on the value of k and the
number of T gates in the desired circuit: a larger value
of k and more T gates imply better circuit privacy. By
sending Alice some polynomials, Bob tells Alice some in-
formation about his program. But since each polynomial
has k terms missing (because Alice tells Bob the values
of k variables), Alice lacks knowledge about this part of
the program. The amount of lack of information is about
k−1 bits for each polynomial, since Bob also sends Alice
the constant term in the polynomial, which carries one
bit or less (the case of less than one bit may happen when
the variables told to Bob are all zero, since then Bob’s
constant term must be zero). Such lack of information
would accumulate across different polynomials (each cor-
responding to a T gate), so that Alice lacks a significant
part of the knowledge about the overall program. Here,
we have ignored the asymptotically vanishing amount of
information about the circuit learnable through the se-
quence of controlled-Pauli gates told to Alice. Note that
in each polynomial, Alice’s lack of knowledge is limited to
some fixed terms. This may mean that the part of circuit
on some subset of the input qubits not related to these
terms may be known quite well by Alice, provided that
these qubits do not interact with the remaining qubits
very often.
III. EXPERIMENTAL DEMONSTRATION
We have performed a quantum optics experiment to
demonstrate some steps in the outer part of the scheme:
the state preparation of a data qubit and a program regis-
ter (qubit), the controlled-Pauli gate on these qubits, the
measurement on the program register after the gate, and
state tomography on the output data qubit. The inner
part, which is the subprocedure for evaluating classical
linear polynomials, can be implemented independently,
since it is connected to the outer part of the scheme clas-
sically. Such inner part can be implemented by known
protocols or by those developed in the future. In our ex-
periment, the controlled-Z, controlled-X and controlled-Y
gates are performed using a single photon’s path and po-
larization degrees of freedom. The photon’s path is the
controlling qubit (the program register) and the polar-
ization is the controlled qubit. For ease of implementa-
tion, we assume directly the existence of a qubit as the
program register as in Fig. 1, instead of implementing
it through measuring one qubit in an entangled pair of
qubits as in Scheme 1. The optical circuit is illustrated
in Fig. 2.
In the setup, a pair of photons is generated by type-I
spontaneous parametric down conversion in a 3-mm-thick
nonlinear beta-barium borate (BBO) crystal pumped by
a 100mW diode laser (centered at 404nm). The circuit
first prepares a polarization state on one photon, while
the other photon is used as the trigger. After passing
through the larger PBS in the middle, the two branches
go to separate paths, this means that the prior polariza-
tion state is actually used as a path state. In each of
the two paths, the polarization state is known (|H〉 or
|V 〉), and we let the photon pass through some combi-
nation of HWP and QWP to get some polarization state
dependent on the path. This effectively implements the
controlled-σj gate in Fig. 1. Then the photon passes
through the PBS again to enter the upper loop. This
loop takes clue from the optical circuit in Fig. 2(b) of
[31]. It consists of a PBS and some mirrors and HWPs
(the HWP4 and HWP5 in Fig. 2), and serves as an ef-
fective 50:50 beam splitter. The effective beam splitter
performs a Hadamard gate on the path states. This im-
plements the H gate in Fig. 1. After the photon comes
out of this loop (including passing through HWP5 on one
output path), it goes into one of the two output ports in
the setup. The two path states at the end correspond
to outcomes of the measurement on the lower qubit in
Fig. 1. In each run of the experiment, we only measure
one polarization state in one output port. The choice of
the port corresponds to choosing one outcome of the X-
basis measurement on the ancilla qubit (in this notation,
the H gate on the ancilla is regarded as part of the mea-
surement). Under a fixed choice of the port, the choice
of the polarization state to be detected is done by the
QWP and HWP placed just before the detector.
Some separate testing shows that the interference visi-
bility of the green (upper) loop and the grey (lower) loop
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FIG. 2: The optical setup for demonstrating some key steps in the scheme. The HWP1 and QWP1 prepare a polarization state,
and after the photon reaches the larger PBS at the middle, the prepared state becomes a path state, representing the controlling
qubit in the controlled-Pauli gate to be performed. The HWP2, QWP2, HWP3 and QWP3 are for preparing polarization states
dependent on the path, representing the results of the identity gate or Pauli gate acting on some initial polarization state. The
HWP4 and HWP5 in the upper block are set to 22.5
◦ and 45◦, respectively. The upper block serves to perform a Hadamard
gate on the path state. The QWP4 and QWP5 are set to 0
◦ but tilted for phase compensation.
are about 0.9983 and 0.9973, respectively.
For each combination of the input state of the con-
trolling qubit, and the gate to be performed, we do five
repeated periods of measurements. The duration of each
measurement period is 20 seconds. We measure four po-
larization states in the selected output port, and recon-
struct the density matrix using a program based on the
maximum likelihood estimation method in [32]. For var-
ious input states of the controlling and the controlled
qubits, and the chosen outcome for the measurement on
the controlling qubit, we calculate the fidelity of the ex-
perimentally found density matrix with the ideal one.
The fidelity between two pure states |ψ〉 and |η〉 is defined
as |〈ψ|η〉|2. The fidelities for some parameterized sets of
input states are listed in the figures below. Figure 3
shows fidelities between the theoretical and experimen-
tal output one-qubit states for the case of controlled-Z
gate acting on input state |1〉⊗ (cos θ|0〉+sin θ|1〉) where
θ is a real parameter, and subsequently measuring the
controlling qubit with the outcome corresponding to |−〉.
The average fidelities for other input state combinations
are also mostly above 0.99.
The other figures illustrate the correctness of the re-
sults from another perspective. The left figure in Fig. 4
shows the theoretical curve and experimental result for
the squared overlap between the output state of the tar-
get qubit and the reference state |φ1〉 = cos(pi8 )|0〉 +
e−i4pi/5 sin(pi
8
)|1〉, for the case that the controlled-Z gate
acts on input state |1〉|ψ〉, with measurement outcome
of the controlling qubit corresponding to |−〉 (same be-
low). The squared overlap of two pure states has the
same definition as the fidelity, and we use this notion to
emphasize that it is not intended to be near 1. The |ψ〉
here is not limited to states located on a circle on the
Bloch sphere: the states used here include some states
of the form cos θ|0〉 + sin θ|1〉, and some states of the
8form cos θ|0〉+ i sin θ|1〉, and another generic pure qubit
state. The right figure in Fig. 4 is for the same in-
put states, and the reference output state is changed to
|φ2〉 = cos(−pi3 )|0〉 + eipi/7 sin(−pi3 )|1〉. The left figure in
Fig. 5 shows the theoretical curve and experimental re-
sult for the squared overlap between the output state of
the target qubit and the reference state |φ1〉 (same as
that in Fig. 4), for the case that the controlled-Z gate
acts on input state |y+〉|ψ〉, where |ψ〉 is not limited to
states located on a circle on the Bloch sphere. The right
figure in Fig. 5 are for the same input states, but with
the reference output state changed to |φ2〉 (same as that
in Fig. 4).
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FIG. 3: Fidelities between the theoretical and experimental
output one-qubit states in the case of a controlled-Z gate act-
ing on input state |1〉 ⊗ (cos θ|0〉+ sin θ|1〉) and subsequently
measuring the controlling qubit with the outcome correspond-
ing to |−〉 (the same outcome is assumed below). The error
bars indicate fluctuations in the experimentally obtained fi-
delities over repeated runs of the experiment.
IV. DISCUSSION
Under the first class of protocols for evaluating clas-
sical linear polynomials, the extreme case of completely
insecure data gives rise to an overall scheme similar to
blind quantum computing (BQC) scheme, but with the
output on a different party. In blind quantum comput-
ing, the client (usually called Alice, but to compare to our
scheme, let us assume the client is Bob and the server is
Alice) has both the data and the program but has lim-
ited quantum capabilities. The client delegates (a part
of) the secret program to the server to let the program
run on the client’s private data (or a blank state), and the
result is returned to the client in the end. Our scheme
in the case of completely insecure data gives rise to a
scheme for BQC if the final steps are modified so that
Bob has the computation result instead of Alice. The
revision required is that Alice teleports her output state
to Bob before the final Pauli corrections, and Bob does
not send her the information for the final Pauli correc-
tions. The blindness is from that each program state is
in a completely mixed qubit for the server. Such BQC
scheme saves the number of rounds of communication
compared to the scheme in [1] and some other existing
schemes. On the other hand, without such modification,
the scheme has the output on Alice’s side, and a practical
application is as follows: Bob serves as a data collecting
party who effectively sends some data to Alice through
the choices of the program states, and Alice does the
main quantum computation, with the output known to
herself. In such case, we no longer have the usual prob-
lem in BQC that the quantum computation needs to be
verified, since Alice wants to get the result.
We remark on the use of program registers sent by
the client Bob, and the associated necessity for Alice to
encrypt her data locally (via the quantum one-time-pad
in our scheme). In many BQC schemes, some qubit in
mixed state (in the view of the server) is sent by the
client to be used as a local program register on the server.
Things are different in (interactive) QHE, in which the
data and the program are initially on opposite parties.
In schemes of (interactive) QHE, the use of a program
register with Bob knowing its content is likely a weak
point in security, since it is modelled by a mixed state,
and we may think of two ways of purifying it, each has its
own problem: (i) if a purifying third party is introduced,
it may be an active party who may collude with some
party or cheat; (ii) if instead a mixed state resource on
the two parties (Alice and Bob) is used, there is no guar-
antee that Bob would not replace his part so that they
share a pure entangled state with the same function in
the protocol, and if Alice’s data qubits are not properly
encrypted, it is likely that Bob may measure his part of
the entangled state at some stage of the protocol in some
suitable basis, and together with the information about
measurement outcomes sent by Alice, he may get some
information about Alice’s data. This issue does not cause
a security problem in BQC, since in BQC the initial data
is on the party who has the program. Our Scheme 1
avoids the problem above by the trick of letting Alice
encrypt the data locally first.
The Scheme 1 contains a procedure of evaluating a
classical linear polynomial of the form (5). For such pro-
cedure, we have introduced a simple classical protocol
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FIG. 4: Left: theoretical curve and experimental result for the squared overlap between the output state of the target qubit
and a reference state |φ1〉, for the case that the controlled-Z gate acts on |1〉|ψ〉, where |ψ〉 is not limited to states located on
a circle on the Bloch sphere. The horizontal axis is for the angle with respect to the center of the Bloch sphere between the
theoretical output state and the reference state |φ1〉. Right: for the same input states, but the reference state of the output is
changed to |φ2〉.
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FIG. 5: Left: theoretical curve and experimental result for the squared overlap between the output state of the target qubit
and a reference state |φ1〉, for the case that the controlled-Z gate acts on |y+〉|ψ〉, where |ψ〉 is not limited to states located on
a circle on the Bloch sphere. The horizontal axis is for the angle with respect to the center of the Bloch sphere between the
theoretical output state and the reference state |φ1〉. Right: for the same input states, but the reference state of the output is
changed to |φ2〉.
with some privacy tradeoff as an example protocol. Such
procedure could be replaced with any classical additive
homomorphic encryption scheme encrypting bits, analo-
gous to the situation in [15]. One can use the relatively
simple schemes in [33, 34] which are not post-quantum
schemes; some post-quantum scheme may be used if the
security against quantum computers is of concern.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have constructed a framework for (interactive)
QHE scheme for general circuits, based on the univer-
sal circuit approach. A feature of the framework is the
compatibility with blind quantum computation. We dis-
cussed two classes of example protocols for the subproce-
10
dure for evaluating a linear polynomial, and such subpro-
cedure is replaceable by other protocols. With the first
class of example protocols, which are fully classical, there
is a tradeoff in the privacy of the data and the privacy of
the circuit in the overall scheme, and the tradeoff is par-
ticularly good when the input is classical or a product real
state. With the second class of example protocols which
require repeated quantum operations on constant num-
ber of qubits, the overall scheme has asymptotic data pri-
vacy and asymptotic circuit privacy (the latter for large
circuits only) under some weak assumptions about the
two parties. We have demonstrated some key steps of
the framework part of the scheme in a quantum optics
experiment.
Apart from the implementation of the subprocedure,
the framework has low requirement on Bob’s quantum
capabilities: he need only be able to prepare and send
single-qubit states, or be able to make single-qubit mea-
surements in one of two bases. We have mentioned in
Sec. II that the framework may be made non-interactive
by using the so-called garden-hose gadgets. Note that in
a computationally-secure leveled QFHE scheme [20], an
almost classical client is also used, but the client provides
the data rather than the circuit. As an alternative to the
first type of protocols mentioned above, it is possible to
use classical additive homomorphic encryption methods
in evaluating the linear polynomials.
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